Since the end of the Cold War, the three major barriers for bilateral military exchanges with the US were arms sales to Taiwan, the US’s extensive and intensive reconnaissance activities in China’s adjacent waters and airspace, and discriminatory laws against China. Now, as the bilateral relationship enters a period of “great power competition,” a more prominent strategic or structural barrier is the asymmetrical nature of the military competition between China and the US.
During the late stages of the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were roughly on par in terms of conventional and nuclear weapons. By comparison, China-US military relations are and will remain asymmetric in the foreseeable future, with the US maintaining a distinct advantage, especially in terms of weaponry, training and systemic capabilities, despite China’s significant progress in military modernization in recent years. This asymmetry, coupled with a lack of mutual trust, could bring instability to bilateral relations.
Furthermore, during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union primarily contested in intermediary regions, such as Eastern Europe and parts of Asia and Africa. Apart from nuclear deterrence, neither side directly threatened the other’s sovereignty or territorial security, nor were they concerned that any parts of their territories or influence were under threat of being “taken away.” In contrast, in the China-US rivalry, competition and confrontation primarily revolve around China’s periphery. This is especially evident in the deep involvement of the US in issues concerning China’s national unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and maritime interests in the East and South China Seas.
Unlike during the Cold War, when the US and the Soviet Union could somewhat accept each other’s power spheres in Europe, today, China and the US have yet to recognize each other’s position and power in East Asian waters, which includes the East China Sea, South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, the crisis management model that worked technically between the US and the Soviet Union cannot be applied to China-US competition. Historical lessons must be drawn from, but not duplicated.
From China’s perspective, the fundamental cause of the risk of military conflicts with the US lies in the increasingly rampant military activities of the US in the vicinity of China. Therefore, establishing rules of conduct for China-US military encounters is akin to putting a seat belt on a speeding driver, which will reduce the risk and cost of US military operations around China.
Unfortunately, the US lacks empathy and fails to consider the situation from China’s viewpoint. It consistently emphasizes its freedom of operation in “international airspace” and “international waters,” framing China’s “excessive reactions” and “expanding maritime presence” as the greatest risks.
Given these vastly different perceptions, both sides have different priorities in their bilateral dialogues and negotiations. While China underscores both national security and operational safety, the US only focuses on the safety of specific operations. Despite the Biden administration’s repeated rhetoric of constructing a “guardrail” with China in the military domain in recent years, it has largely concentrated on the technical and operational aspects of risk, neglecting the underlying causes of these risks.
The result is that although both sides want to avoid conflicts and establish crisis management mechanisms, military exchanges between the two sides are often talking at cross purposes, each speaking a different language, a scenario unlikely to change in the near future.